This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the risk-averse agent's action generates information that is not directly verifiable but is used to make a risky decision in a formulation more general than previously studied. It focuses on the impact on the decision made and the contract used, establishing a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to gain by distorting decisions away from what is efficient and conditions under which there is no conflict between incentives to make decisions and to take action. Applications to investing in a risky project and bidding to supply a good or service illustrate those results.
Introduction
In the classic principal-agent problem studied by Mirrlees (1999) , Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) , the agent takes unverifiable action that directly affects the principal's return. But in many practical applications, the agent's action generates information that is used to make a decision influencing that return. Managers are expected to investigate profitability before deciding how much to invest or which project to undertake. Those bidding to supply goods and services are expected to find out about the probability that any given bid will be accepted before deciding what to bid. Portfolio managers are expected to find out about potential investments before choosing portfolios for clients. General medical practitioners are expected to assess what specialist services a patient requires before arranging for them. This paper is concerned with two questions about such settings:
1. How does the decision made by the agent under an optimal contract differ from the decision the principal would make given the same information?
2. Do incentives for the agent to make decisions conflict with those for taking action to acquire information?
If the information generated by the agent's action is verifiable, information generation can be treated as a standard one-dimensional principal-agent problem with the agent's "output" the information itself, and the decision treated separately. But in many of the applications, the information itself is not directly verifiable. What can be verified is the return to the principal resulting from the agent's decision but not the information on which the decision was based. Demski and Sappington (1987) refer to this as delegated expertise. In such situations, the contract between principal and agent must provide incentives for the agent not only to acquire information but also to make an appropriate decision on the basis of that information.
There are a number of papers in the literature concerned with such settings. Demski and Sappington (1987) has the most general formulation but does not consider the first of the questions of concern here. Other papers consider formulations that are restricted in important respects. Lambert (1986) , Biais and Casamatta (1999) , Feess and Walzl (2004) and Inderst and Ottaviani (forthcoming) consider no more than three possible levels of return to the principal. Since incentives depend only on the payments for these returns, the same incentives can then be achieved by different forms of contract and the results give little guide as to what form of contract is optimal in more general settings with a continuum of returns. Moreover, in all those papers, as in Core and Qian (2002) , Barron and Waddell (2003) , and Gromb and Martimort (2007) , the agent can choose between only two decisions.
Then, in answer to question 1 above, there is only one direction in which the decision can differ from what the principal would choose if given the same information as the agent. Some papers limit the distribution of returns for each decision to those characterized by two parameters, either normal (Stoughton (1993) , Demski and Dye (1999) , Barron and Waddell (2003) , and Core and Qian (2002) ) or other (Palomino and Prat (2003) ). That limits the ways in which the agent's decision can affect the return to the principal. Demski and Dye (1999) , Stoughton (1993) , and Feltham and Wu (2001) limit contracts to predetermined forms rather than derive results on optimal forms. In the literature on managerial compensation, a common restriction is to debt, equity and stock options. Diamond (1998) , Biais and Casamatta (1999) , Palomino and Prat (2003) , Feess and Walzl (2004) , Gromb and Martimort (2007) and Inderst and Ottaviani (forthcoming) are concerned only with a risk-neutral agent who has limited liability. 1 This paper adopts a more general formulation to assess what can be said more broadly about the two questions posed above. The agent is risk averse, with no restriction on either the number of possible levels of return to the principal or the number of possible decisions by the agent, and with decisions influencing the distribution of returns in quite general ways. The contract between principal and agent is restricted only by the information that is verifiable; as in the papers cited above, the verifiable information is the ex post return to the principal. The paper illustrates its results with two applications. In the first, the principal employs an agent to decide how much to invest in a risky project about whose return the agent's action provides information. In the second, the principal employs an agent to tender a bid to supply a good or service to a buyer after first taking an action to acquire information about the probability of different bids being accepted. Both applications have a continuum of possible decisions because the agent can choose any amount to invest or bid. As a result, they also have a continuum of possible returns. 1 Melumad et al. (1995) and Aghion and Tirole (1997) also consider an agent who makes decisions in addition to taking action. There, however, the principal can monitor (and possibly over-rule) the agent directly rather than having to rely on inducing the agent to reveal information. In Osband (1989) , the agent is a forecaster whom the principal wishes to induce to incur costs to refine the forecast and also to truthfully report the forecast estimate but the forecaster makes no further decisions affecting the principal's payoff. Povel and Raith (2004) analyse a model in which an agent observes information that is not verifiable and then makes a choice that affects the principal's payoff. But the choice in that case concerns only a transfer, how much debt to repay. In Prendergast (2002) the agent's information acquisition is costless; the action is taken after the information has been acquired and affects only the principal's return. Crémer and Khalil (1992) , Lewis and Sappington (1997) , Crémer et al. (1998a) , Crémer et al. (1998b) and Szalay (2009) are concerned with incentives for a supplier to acquire information in an otherwise standard procurement context before accepting a contract with the principal, not after as in the other papers cited here. Dai et al. (2006) consider delegation to an agent with private information ex ante. Bergemann and Välimäki (2006) survey the literature on the role of information in mechanism design. On question 1 above, the paper gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to gain by having the agent deviate from an efficient decision rule that corresponds to what the principal would have decided with the same information as the agent. In general, the principal gains from doing so for the reason familiar from adverse-selection models: deviations from an efficient decision have only second-order effects on the principal's expected return but can have a first-order effect on the expected payment to the agent. As one would expect with a risk-averse agent, the principal gains from a deviation in a direction that reduces the risk the agent bears. If the agent were to receive all the return from the decision directly, the agent would reduce this risk by taking a decision that results in a distribution of returns that stochastically dominates the distribution of returns from an efficient decision. But, with the agent rewarded through a contract, what reduces the risk to the agent depends not only on the risk characteristics of the decisions themselves but also on the characteristics of the contract with the principal. Thus, even where decisions can be ordered by second-order stochastic dominance, the principal does not necessarily gain by a deviation to a stochastically dominating decision. Deviation to a dominating decision does, however, increase the principal's payoff when optimal contracts for implementing an efficient decision rule have certain characteristics. Those characteristics apply to the investment and bidding applications. In the former, the agent is induced to invest less in the risky project, in the latter to bid less aggressively (that is set a lower price for supply with a correspondingly higher probability the bid is accepted) than if the principal were able to verify the agent's information and action.
On question 2 above, there is no conflict between incentives for decisions and for action when the decision rule is chosen by the agent even if not imposed as a constraint on the principal's optimization. The paper shows that to be the case if the rule is first-order stochastically dominant and the distribution of returns has an appropriate monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) with respect to the agent's actions. First-order stochastic dominance implies that the rule is preferred by any decision-maker with utility increasing in the return. But the MLRP ensures that an optimal contract to provide incentives for action has the agent's reward, and hence the agent's utility, increasing in the return. Under certain conditions, a decision rule will also be chosen if it is second-order stochastically dominant. Those conditions provide a link to the literature on the "first-order approach" to solving the classic principal-agent problem. Jewitt (1988) shows that the first-order approach is valid if the optimal contract makes the agent's utility a concave function of the return to the principal. But second-order stochastic dominance implies that the decision rule is preferred by any decision-maker with a utility function concave in the return.
First-order stochastic dominance applies quite naturally to the bidding application when the principal wishes the agent always to choose the highest bid that will certainly be successful given the information received. Moreover, in that application, payment to the agent is monotone non-decreasing in the observed returns even if the MLRP does not hold because the agent would always prefer a lower bid, with greater probability of success, if the reward for success were higher. This gives a reason for the contract to be monotone that depends on neither the MLRP holding, as discussed by Hart and Holmström (1987) , nor the agent being able to destroy part of the return in a way the principal cannot observe, as discussed in Innes (1990) . Moreover, there are plausible circumstances in which the contract has a flat segment for the lowest returns, as with compensation in the form a salary plus performance-related bonus or stock option that a manager need not exercise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 analyses optimal deviations from efficient decision rules. Section 4 considers conflicts between incentives to make decisions and incentives to take action. Section 5 discusses the applications. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
The model 2.1 Environment
A risk-neutral principal employs an agent to both choose an action a 2 A and make a decision b 2 B = b; b with uncertain monetary return y 2 [y; y] to the principal. The action has a direct utility cost to the agent, the decision does not. In this respect the environment, like those in the papers cited in the Introduction, differs from the multi-task agency environment of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . The agent's action may (but need not) affect the return directly, as in the classic principal-agent model, but also yields the agent a signal s 2 [s; s] providing information about the distributions of returns to the possible decisions and, hence, about which decision it is optimal to make. The probability density function for s given a is denoted f (s;a). The probability distribution function of the return y given decision b; signal s and action a is denoted G(y;b;s;a) . For simplicity, the analysis is restricted to cases in which the set of possible actions is either an interval, so A = [a; a], or binary, so A = fa; ag with a < a. A useful benchmark is an efficient decision rule b (:) that the principal would use given the same information as the agent. Such a rule satisfies b (s;a) 2 arg max 
As conventional in principal-agent models, the agent's utility is additively separable in income and action. The utility from being paid P and taking action a is denoted u(P) v(a) with the standard properties u 0 (P) > 0; u 00 (P) < 0; v(a) strictly increasing and strictly convex.
The agent's reservation utility for accepting a contract with the principal is denoted U, with U +v(a) > 0 u(0), which ensures the agent is not willing to work for the principal unpaid.
The sequence of events is as follows. As in the classic principal-agent model, the principal makes a "take it or leave it" offer of a contract to the agent. If accepted, the agent chooses an action a, receives a signal s, and makes a decision b, in that order. The return from the decision is then realized and the agent is paid according to the contract. The essential difference from the classic principal-agent model is that the signal received by the agent is not itself verifiable. If it were, the incentive issues here would reduce to those of the classic model. 2
Contracts between principal and agent
A contract between principal and agent specifies the payment to the agent as a function of verifiable outcomes. The outcomes here are a;s;y; and b. In keeping with the classical principal-agent literature, a is taken to be information private to the agent -without that, the contractual issues of interest here disappear. In keeping with the underlying motivation of the paper that the information generated by the agent's action is unverifiable, s is also taken to be information private to the agent. In common with the literature discussed in the Introduction, the decision b is taken to be noncontractible. This is appropriate where the decision is not readily observed by the principal or, as commonly assumed in the incomplete contracts literature, describing the different possible decisions unambiguously in sufficient detail in a legally enforceable contract is either impossible or too costly to be worthwhile. Thus the only verifiable outcome is y. A contract P(:) specifies the payment P(y) from the principal to the agent when y occurs.
An agent facing contract P(:) who takes action a, receives signal s and makes decision b has expected utility from the monetary compensation given by u(b;s;a;P(:)) 
An optimal contract maximizes the principal's payoff subject to feasibility, individual rationality and incentive compatibility for the agent. The optimal contract problem can be written in the way standard with principal-agent problems as Constraint (8) is the individual rationality condition that the agent has expected utility from the decision rule b(:), when choosing action a under contract P(:), no lower than from not agreeing to the contract in the first place. Constraint (9) ensures that the agent receives at least as much expected utility from choosing action a as from choosing any other action a 0 2 A. Constraint (10) Proofs of all propositions are in an appendix. The essential point in this result is that, if (12) holds, there is always sufficient gain from some action a > a, with its associated efficient decision rule b (:; a) implemented using a contract with the formˆP(:;u;k) in (11), to ensure that the agent strictly prefers a to any other action in A (including a), satisfy the individual rationality constraint (8), and yield the principal a positive expected payoff. If (12) holds with α 1=2, that expected payoff is not only positive but strictly greater than the expected payoff from implementing a with its associated efficient decision rule b (:; a), using a contract with the formˆP(:;u;k) in (11) with k set equal to 0. To implement a, k = 0 is optimal because no incentives for action are required and k = 0 results in the agent using an efficient decision rule b (:; a) while bearing no risk. But the principal then faces no trade-off between incentives for action, risk-bearing and efficient decisions when implementing a and thus cannot do better than implement an efficient decision rule b (:; a). Thus, when some a > a, with its efficient decision rule b (:; a), does better than that, a cannot be optimal.
Optimal departures from efficient decision rules
As already noted, it is always possible for the principal to induce the agent to choose an efficient decision rule b (:; a) for any given action a. This section is concerned with whether it is optimal for the principal to choose a contract that does this and, if not, how the optimal decision rule departs from what is efficient. For the moment, ignore the issue of what action it is optimal for the principal to implement. Section 4 returns to the interaction of actions and decision rules.
Given sufficient continuity, it is in general worthwhile for the principal to have the agent deviate from an efficient decision rule because a marginal deviation has only a second-order effect on the expected return to the principal whereas any reduction in expected payment to the agent has a first-order effect. It is natural to expect that the deviation will be in the direction of reducing the risk borne by the agent. But that risk depends on the contract with the principal, not just on the inherent risk characteristics of the decisions, so changes in risk based on such measures as stochastic dominance of the underlying decisions do not capture the full impact. The first result in this section makes precise the sense in which a deviation from an efficient decision rule affects the risk borne by the agent.
For this result, consider the optimal way for the principal to induce the agent to take action a and adopt decision rule b(:), as given by the problem in (7)- (10) but with the decision rule fixed at the specified b(:). Call an optimal solution, contract and payoff for that problem constrained optimal for fa;b(:)g. Under the conditions in Proposition 1, the principal can always implement an efficient decision rule b (:) for some action a > a by a contractˆP(:;u;k) that satisfies (11). f (s;a)ds < 0:
Proposition 2 Let P(:) be a constrained optimal contract that implements action
The result in Proposition 2 is a direct consequence of the envelope theorem applied in two ways: (1) in a solution that implements b(:), the contract P(:) must be such that b(s;a) maximizes the agent's expected utility given (s;a) so, by the envelope theorem, a marginal change in b(s;a) by itself leaves the agent's expected utility unchanged to first order; and (2) because b (s;a) is, by definition, a decision that maximizes the principal's expected return gross of payments to the agent, a marginal deviation from b (s;a), possibly in different directions for different s, leaves that expected return unchanged to first order. Together these imply that distorting the decision rule marginally away from b (:) affects the principal's payoff to first order only by the direct effect on the principal's expected payment to the agent. T he expression on the left-hand side of (13) corresponds to that direct effect. As long as it is negative, the principal can achieve the same expected return for lower expected payment to the agent by a marginal deviation of the decision rule away from b (s;a).
The left-hand side of (13) compounds terms in dG(:) that affect the riskiness of the decision itself with the contract P(:). For a risk-neutral agent, it is necessarily zero because the term in square brackets is then just ∂ u(b (s;a);s;a;P(:)) =∂b and, by (10), b (s;a) maximizesˆu(b;s;a;P(:)) over b. That is to be expected: for a risk-neutral agent without limited liability, it is straightforward to achieve the firstbest outcome, so distorting the decision rule away from efficiency cannot increase the principal's payoff. It is also zero for a risk-averse agent if P(:) is independent of y, as a result of which the agent bears no risk. (Since P(:) independent of y corresponds to the contractˆP(:;u;k) in (11) with k = 0, the agent would also adopt an efficient decision rule but would, of course, always choose action â ). It is thus clear that this direct effect depends not only on dG(y;b;s;a), the underlying risk characteristic of the decisions which is all that would determine the risk to the decision-maker in the absence of an agency relationship, but also on the contract with the principal. Proposition 2 shows that the contract for a constrained optimal solution is the appropriate contract for assessing the effect of a change in the decision rule on the risk borne by the agent. The proposition supposes that u(b;s;a;P(:)) and r (b;s;a;P(:)) are differentiable with respect to b for all (s;a) when evaluated at b (s;a). It is clear from (3) and (5) that a sufficient condition for this is that dG(y;b;s;a) is differentiable with respect to b for all (y;b;s;a).
The result in Proposition 2 can be related to the standard measure of riskiness of decisions based on second-order stochastic dominance when the contract that implements b (:) is strictly convex, as shown in the following result. To state the result, let Condition (15) corresponds to b (s;a) stochastically dominating a marginally higher b(s;a) in the second-order sense, condition (16) to a marginally higher b(s;a) stochastically dominating b (s;a) in the second-order sense. Since P(y) is a payment from principal to agent, the principal's payoff is strictly concave when P 00 (:) > 0. The principal's net payoff from returns then corresponds to that of a risk-averse individual. Thus increasing b(s;a) marginally from b (s;a) reduces the principal's payoff in the first case and increases it in the second. Combined with Proposition 2, therefore, Proposition 3 implies the following. This conclusion is intuitive. Distorting the decision for any (s;a) in a direction that second-order stochastically dominates b (s;a) reduces the inherent riskiness of the decision but may not itself benefit the principal for some contracts. If, however, the contract makes payment to the agent strictly convex in the return y, the principal's payoff is strictly concave in that return so the principal gains from the reduction in risk. For a contract of the formˆP(:;u;k) in (11) that induces the agent to use b (s;a) for all (s;a), the contract is strictly convex for all y when k > 0 (as it must be to implement any a > a). To see this note that, from differentiation of (11),
Corollary 1 Fo r P(:) twice-differentiable almost everywhere with P
and u 00 ˆP (y;u;k) ˆP 0 (y;u;k) 2 + u 0 ˆP (y;u;k) ˆP 00 (y;u;k) = 0 soˆP 00 (y;u;k) = u 00 ˆP (y;u;k) ˆP 0 (y;u;k)
WithˆP 0 (y;u;k) 6 = 0 for all y, u 0 (:) > 0 and u 00 (:) < 0, it follows directly thatˆP 00 (:) > 0. Of course, the formˆP(:;u;k) is not necessarily constrained optimal for b (:). But under some conditions, as discussed below, it is the only form of contract that implements b (:), so it is then necessarily constrained optimal for b (:).
The issue of when contracts of the formˆP(:;u;k) are the only ones that implement an efficient decision rule is of concern in Diamond (1998) . Diamond (1998) considers a risk-neutral agent (with limited liability), in which case a contract of the formˆP(:;u;k) is linear in the return y. For that case, he gives conditions for the "near-linearity" result that an optimal contract for a > a converges to linear as the ratio of the principal's expected return (gross of payment to the agent) to the agent's cost of taking actions a > a increases. Intuitively, as this ratio increases, the cost of providing incentives for action becomes smaller relative to the gains from implementing efficient decisions, so an optimal contract converges to one that implements efficient decisions. When contracts of the formˆP(:;u;k) are the only contracts that implement an efficient decision rule, convergence is to such a contract.
The condition Diamond (1998) gives for this is that the decision set is sufficiently rich for the agent's range of probability choices to have full dimensionality (given the constraint that probabilities add to one). The intuition is as follows. Suppose the principal were to offer a contract that departs from the formˆP(:;u;k) by offering a higher payment for y 1 and a lower payment y 2 . Then, with a sufficiently rich decision set, the agent can always gain by using a decision rule that increases the probability of y 1 occurring, and lowers the probability of y 2 occurring, relative to an efficient decision rule.
Here the agent's risk aversion needs also to be taken into account. The next proposition gives a set of conditions, satisfied for the applications that follow, under which only contracts of the formˆP(:;u;k) in (11) implement an efficient decision rule. To state the result, let Φ(y;a;b(:)) = 
denote the set of returns y with strictly positive likelihood given action a and decision rule b(:). Conditions 1-3 in this proposition are that, with only two possible levels of return for given (b;s;a), either just one depends on the decision or their probabilities are independent of the decision. Note the difference from Diamond (1998) . These conditions restrict the extent to which the agent can manipulate the probabilities of the returns. But, importantly for the result, they tie down the ways to provide incentives sufficiently to ensure that, for y 2 Y (a;b (:; a)), only with a contract of the formˆP(:;u;k) in (11) will the agent's decision rule given by (10) correspond to an efficient decision rule given by (1). They are satisfied in some applications, such as those to investment in a risky project and to bidding to supply a good or service in Section 5. Since y = 2 Y (a;b (:; a)) are never realized when b (:; a) is chosen, P(y) for these y can be set at the same large penalty to the agent. Then Proposition 4 allows Proposition 3 to be applied directly to those applications.
Conflict between incentives for action and decisions
In the classic principal-agent problem there is an inherent conflict between insurance and incentives for action because incentives for action necessarily impose risk on the agent. In the model used here, there is also a potential conflict with incentives to make decisions. This section explores that conflict.
There is no inherent conflict between providing incentives for decisions and providing insurance. As explained above, the agent will make an efficient decision with any contract of the formˆP(:;u;k) in (11), including one with k = 0. But, with k = 0, the agent's reward is independent of the return y, so the agent bears no risk. It turns out that there may also not be a conflict between incentives for action and incentives for making decisions. Indeed, the existence of the decision may even reduce the conflict between insurance and incentives for action. A striking example is when the probability distribution G(y;b;s;a) for the return y given decision b and signal s takes the formˆG(y;s b). If b is a fixed parameter, the principal's problem (7)-(10) reduces to a classic principal-agent problem: the agent's action a affects s which, in turn, affects the distribution of returns y. (Constraint (10) becomes redundant.) Inducing the agent to choose a > a involves, in the usual way, a tradeoff between providing the agent with incentives to take the action and insuring the agent's income. With the additional decision, however, an efficient decision rule satisfies, from (1) The principal's expected return is then Rŷ y ydG(y;β ), independent of s. Thus the principal no longer has reason to be concerned with the value of s and so has no reason to provide the agent with incentives for action to influence its distribution. If, moreover, the payment to the agent is made independent of the outcome, the agent is indifferent as to which decision is made and hence will use an efficient decision rule b (:). Then there is no conflict between incentives for action and incentives for making decisions. Indeed, the possibility of a decision in addition to an action removes any need for the principal to provide incentives for action at all.
This example is clearly special in that the possibility of taking the decision makes any one signal as good as any other. But the absence of conflict between incentives for action and incentives for taking decisions is not restricted to cases in which it is optimal for there to be no incentives for action. Suppose that, for given a and each s, the decision b(s;a) the principal wishes the agent to take stochastically dominates any other decision in either the first-order or the second-order sense. If the stochastic dominance is first-order then, from a standard result, the agent prefers b(s;a) to any other decision for each s provided only that the contract ensures the agent's utility is increasing in y. If the stochastic dominance is second-order then, again from a standard result, the agent prefers b(s;a) to any other decision for each s provided only that the contract ensures the agent's utility is increasing and concave in y. With these forms of stochastic dominance, the principal thus has substantial freedom in choosing an incentive contract to implement b(:).
To explore this formally, use Φ(y;a;b(:)) in (18) s;a;b(:) ) is the subset of decisions for which any returns y that have zero probability under b(:) given action a have zero probability given a and signal s. Decisions in this subset are the only ones that seriously constrain the principal in implementing b(:). Those not in this subset have strictly positive probability of giving rise to some return y that has zero probability if b(:) is chosen. Thus the principal can always induce the agent not to take such a decision by a sufficiently large penalty if that y occurs.
Proposition 5 Suppose the principal implements action a > a and decision rule b(:). Then, the conditions (10) for the agent to adopt b(:) do not constrain optimal contract payments for returns y 2 Y (a;b(:)) if either of the following two sets of conditions hold: 1. (a) for each s 2 [s; s], G(y;b(s;a);s;a) first-order stochastically dominates G(y;b;s;a) for all decisions b 2ˆB(s;a;b(:)); and (b) L(y;a;b(:)) is nondecreasing in y for y 2 Y (a;b(:)); in this case, P(y) is non-decreasing for all y 2 Y (a;b(:));

(a) for each s 2 [s; s], G(y;b(s;a);s;a) second-order stochastically dominates G(y;b;s;a) for all decisions b 2ˆB(s;a;b(:)); (b) L(y;a;b(:)) is nondecreasing and concave in y for y 2 Y (a;b(:)); and (c) the agent's utility function is such that
The conditions in Proposition 5 ensure that there is no conflict between implementing the decision rule b(:) and providing the agent with incentives for action. Specifically, under those conditions the principal can chose payments for any returns that may actually occur if the agent uses the decision rule b(:), that is returns y 2 Y (a;b(:)), to optimally induce the agent to take action a without having to be concerned about inducing the agent to use the decision rule b(:). Payments for returns that never occur under b(:), that is returns y = 2 Y (a;b(:)), can be set to result in a large penalty to the agent without causing any conflict because these returns are never actually realized.
The essential reasoning underlying Proposition 5 is the following. A standard result from principal-agent theory with no additional decision is that the shape of the optimal contract to induce action is determined by the likelihood ratio of returns as a function of the action -when that likelihood ratio is monotone, payment is non-decreasing in the return to the principal. The corresponding likelihood term with the additional decision included here is L(y;a;b(:)) defined in (20). When, as in Part 1 of Proposition 5, this is monotone, the payment to the agent is nondecreasing in the return to the principal, so the agent will use the desired decision rule if it is stochastically dominant in the first-order sense. When, as in Part 2 of Proposition 5, the payment to the agent also results in expected utility that is concave, the agent will make the desired decision if it is stochastically dominant in the second-order sense. The conditions in Proposition 5 arise naturally in some applications, as shown in Section 5 below.
Proposition 3 in Demski and Sappington (1987) gives a related result on firstorder stochastic dominance. Part 1 of Proposition 5 extends that result in two significant respects. The first is that it does not assume the underlying distribution function to be convex. That assumption is used widely in the literature on the validity of the first-order approach to principal-agent problems to ensure that the agent's first-order condition for choice of action is sufficient, as well as necessary, in order to rule out alternative solutions to the first-order condition that do not correspond to a maximum. The proof here, however, applies to any solution to the first-order condition and, hence, to the solution that corresponds to a maximum whether or not it is unique. Since it is widely recognized that such an assumption is unappealing, see Jewitt (1988) , removing the need for it is a worthwhile gain. The second is that the proposition extends the result to stochastic dominance that applies after excluding those decisions for which there is positive probability mass of returns under some decision rule but for which the probability mass is zero under b(:). From a pure theory perspective, that is straightforward. But it is significant for applications. For example, it allows the proposition to apply to the bidding application discussed below when it otherwise would not. There is no counterpart in Demski and Sappington (1987) to Part 2 of Proposition 5.
Applications
Investment in a risky project
This application develops the model in Lambert (1986) to allow the amount of investment in a risky project to be a continuous, rather than an "all or nothing", decision. The agent chooses what proportion b of a budget specified by the principal to invest in the risky project. The project has return q(b) with probability s 2 [s;1], with s > 0, and return 0 with probability 1 s, where q 0 (b) > 0 and q 00 (b) < 0 so the project has diminishing returns. The rest is invested in a riskless asset with return r. Thus the total return y to the principal given b is y = r (1 b) + q(b); with probability s; r (1 b); with probability 1 s:
The agent has two possible actions, a for which the signal received corresponds to the correct value of s and a that reveals no information, with v(a) > v(a). In the absence of further information, the agent must make the decision on the prior probability, denoted s = s 0 , that the return to investing b in the project will be q(b). 
for which the first-order condition for an interior solution is
Since q 00 (b) < 0, this determines a unique solution for b (s;a). The case of "all or nothing" investment considered by Lambert (1986) 
From (24), the bottom line of (25) is zero when evaluated at b (s; a), so the expression is non-negative for all y and, for s < 1, strictly positive for some y 2 ϒ(b (s;a);s;a). Thus, for s < 1, (15) is satisfied and, by Proposition 3, the upper part of (17) applies. Hence, by Proposition 2, the principal gains by reducing the amount invested in the risky project below the efficient level conditional on implementing a. (For s = 1, all the terms in (25) are zero when evaluated at b (s; a), so the principal does not gain by deviating from efficient investment.) Whether it is optimal for the principal to induce the agent to choose action a rather than a depends, of course, on the agent's utility function u(:) and the extent to which v(a) exceeds v(a). Proposition 1 for the general model gives conditions for which it is. When it is, making use of a risk-averse agent results in under-investment in the risky project whenever s < 1. This conclusion differs from that in Lambert (1986) for which, because the investment is "all or nothing", over-investment can incur. Here, with b continuous, the principal always has the possibility of inducing the agent to take a marginally less risky decision for which the cost in terms of efficiency is of only second order. In this respect then, the over-investment result in Lambert (1986) does not generalize.
Bidding to supply a good or service
Another economic application that illustrates the results is that of a principal who wishes the agent to tender a bid to supply a good or service to a buyer whose reser-vation value is unknown. (It is straightforward to reverse the analysis for a principal who is a buyer, as in a takeover bid or in the standard procurement models in Laffont and Tirole (1993) , though in the latter case with the cost of supply not verifiable after the purchase has been completed.) Let θ 2 0; θ be the buyer's privately known valuation of the good or service, with density function h(θ) capturing the principal's and agent's common beliefs about θ. By taking one of two actions a and a, with v(a) < v(a), the agent acquires information about the buyer's reservation value and thus about the optimal price to bid. That information corresponds to the signal s 2 [s; s], with density function denoted ξ (s;θ;a). The price to bid corresponds to the decision b. The buyer accepts the bid if θ b. The probability of acceptance given action a and signal s, which corresponds to 1 G(0; b;s;a) in the general model, is
For notational simplicity, let the cost of supply be zero so that b is the return to the principal from a successful bid. The return from an unsuccessful bid is y = 0. Then Part 1 of this result establishes that payment to the agent must be non-decreasing in the return for the set of bids that are actually chosen. The reason is that a lower bid never has a lower probability of being successful. If it also has a higher reward conditional on being successful, it will always be preferred by the agent. The contract need not be everywhere non-decreasing if, as illustrated in Figure 1 , bids between b 0 and b 00 are not to be chosen for any s when the action a is implemented. But with these bids never actually chosen, the relationship between payment and return for the realized returns in any actual data will be non-decreasing. Moreover, if as in Part 2 each bid above some levelb is to be chosen for some s, and each bid belowb not chosen for any s, the whole contract can be monotone without loss to the principal because the rewards for successful bids belowb can all be set at P(0) without affecting incentive compatibility or individual rationality. The contract then has a flat segment for the lowest returns, as with compensation in the form of salary plus a performance-related bonus for performance above some specified level or stock options that do not have to be exercised. Note that the argument makes use only of the property that a lower bid is at least as likely to be accepted as a higher one, a property inherent to the economics of the bidding framework, and does not depend on the agent being able to destroy part of the return in a way the principal cannot observe, as discussed in Innes (1990) , nor on an MLRP assumption concerning the density of the returns for action a relative to that for a, as discussed by Hart and Holmström (1987) . This application thus provides a very natural environment for payment being non-decreasing in the return that does not depend on special assumptions about probability distributions.
b(:) and a can be implemented by contract P(:) only if, for all s 2 [s; s], P(b(s;a)) P(b) for all b < b(s;a).
If there existsb such that
Propositions 3 and 4 can be applied to this bidding application to give the following result derived in the appendix. (11) for all y that can occur when b (:; a) is used;
marginally reducing b(s; a) below b (s; a) for any s 2 [s; s] increases the principal's payoff above the constrained optimal level.
The restriction on h θ in this result ensures that it is never efficient to bid the highest possible reservation value of the buyer, that on ξ (s;θ;a)h(θ) that it is always efficient to bid more than zero. Thus the efficient bid is always strictly interior to 0; θ . Bids at the endpoints permit greater freedom in the choice of contract because there is only one direction in which the agent can deviate. But under plausible
P(y)
b′′ y 0 y b′ (11) induces efficient bidding. Under those conditions, Part 2 has the implication that, when using a risk-averse agent to bid, the principal gains from inducing less aggressive bidding, with a higher probability of the bid being successful, than if all information were verifiable.
The bidding application can also be used to illustrate the results in Proposition 5. Instead of the assumptions in Corollary 2, suppose h(θ) = 0 for θ 2 [0;θ] for some θ 2 0; θ ; s = θ ; s = θ; ξ (s;θ;a) = 0; for s > θ; for all s;θ 2 θ ; θ ;a 2 fa; ag;
ξ (s;θ;a) > 0; for s = θ; for all s;θ 2 θ ; θ ;a 2 fa; ag:
The top line of (30) ensures that, even without any information, the optimal bid is strictly positive. The middle line implies that the signal s is a lower bound on the buyer's valuation θ, so a strictly positive bid of b = s is always successful.
The bottom line ensures there is strictly positive probability density that this lower bound is the true value, so a bid b > s always has positive probability of being unsuccessful. Suppose also that
Then the derivative with respect to b of the maximand in (29) is negative for b > s for all a, so the solution to (29) is b (s;a) = s for all a. That is, the efficient bid is the highest bid that is sure to be successful. Provided success is sufficiently important, b (s;a) will also be the optimal bid. Proposition 1 gives conditions under which it is then also optimal to implement action a. The economic interpretation is that the bid b = s that is sure to be successful is sufficiently profitable for all s that it is not worth risking losing that profit with a marginally higher bid that may not be successful. Winning a particular contract may, for example, be crucial to the survival of a firm, a situation faced by Rolls-Royce with its RB211 jet engines in the 1970s. These properties allow Proposition 5 to be applied. When the bidding rule b(:) to be implemented specifies only strictly positive bids that are always successful, a return of zero has probability zero if the agent adopts that rule and hence is not in the set Y (a;b(:)), defined in (19), of the returns that may actually be realized if the agent uses b(:). Thus, any bid that may be unsuccessful given s is not in the setˆB(s; a;b(:)) defined in (21) and can be ruled out by a sufficiently large penalty for an unsuccessful outcome. Moreover, the highest bid that guarantees success stochastically dominates all lower bids. Thus the stochastic dominance properties of Part 1(a) of Proposition 5 are satisfied. Moreover, an agent who deviates by choosing a = a is also induced to choose a bid b(s;a) that is always successful. Then, from (27) Thus, from (18), Φ(y;a;b(:)) = f (y;a); for y 2 θ ; θ ; 0; for y < θ :
In (20), the lower part applies because A = fa; ag. Thus,
If this expression is non-decreasing in y, the remaining condition of Part 1 of Proposition 5, Part 1(b), is also satisfied and Proposition 5 applies. That will be the case whenever the MLRP corresponding to f (s;a)= f (s; a) non-increasing applies. Finally, from (28) and (30), f (s;a) > 0 for all s 2 θ ; θ , each b 2 θ ; θ is chosen for some s, and b 2 [0;θ) is not chosen for any s. Thus Part 2 of Proposition 6 applies. These results are collected in the following corollary. s; s] , selects the highest bid that will be successful for sure.
Corollary 3 Fo r the bidding application, suppose (30) holds and the principal chooses a contract that ensures the agent uses a bidding rule b(:) that, for each
1. There is no loss to the principal in restricting the contract to a form in which payment is non-decreasing in the return to the principal.
The conditions (10) for the agent to adopt b(:) when implementing a do not constrain an optimal contract for positive returns if f (s;a)= f (s; a) is nonincreasing for all s 2 [s; s].
An example with f (s;a)= f (s; a) non-increasing for all s 2 [s; s] is s uniform on [θ + a(θ θ);θ], θ uniform on θ ; θ and a; a 2 [0;1) so
Then, from (28) and the middle condition in (30),
(1 a)ln(1=a)
; if s 2 θ + a θ θ ;θ + a θ θ ;
which is a non-increasing function of s.
The assumptions in Corollary 3 may not be widely satisfied in practice. But they serve to illustrate that Proposition 5 does indeed apply in some economic contexts.
Concluding remarks
This paper has been concerned with a principal-agent problem in which a riskaverse agent's action reveals information that is not itself verifiable but is used by the agent to make a decision on which the return is verifiable. It has used a formulation more general than those in the literature. In such settings, the agent has to be induced not only to take action to acquire information but also to make an appropriate decision given that information. The analysis has focused on two issues: (1) the effect on the decision made, and (2) the potential conflict between incentives to make decisions and incentives to take action.
On the second issue, the paper gives conditions under which inducing the agent to adopt a decision rule that is first-order or second-order stochastically dominant imposes no substantive restriction on a contract that is optimal for inducing the agent to take action to acquire information. On the first, it is shown that the decision is distorted in a direction that reduces the risk borne by a risk-averse agent in a sense that is made precise. That sense differs from standard definitions of reducing risk because it depends not only on the risk characteristics of the decisions themselves but also on the contract with the principal. For certain contract forms, however, it is satisfied by second-order stochastic dominance. The paper uses applications to investing in a risky project and to bidding to supply a good or service to show how those results can be applied. Additional results are derived for the bidding application. Payment to the agent is always a non-decreasing function of any returns that are potentially observable. Moreover if, as is optimal under certain conditions, the principal wishes the agent to choose the highest bid that will be successful for sure, a contract that is monotone everywhere (even for returns not potentially observable) is optimal but it may have flat sections like rewards to managers that take the form of a salary plus performance-related bonus or stock options.
There are numerous examples of agency in which the agent takes action to acquire information that is subsequently used to make decisions. Much managerial activity takes this form: investigating profitability before deciding how much to invest or which project to undertake, making bids for the supply or purchase of goods and services after investigating the probability that a given bid will be successful, making portfolio decisions after acquiring information about stocks, and so on. Agency relationships of this type are a fundamental part of economic life. In some of those contexts, the decision itself may be verifiable, in which case the principal could make payment conditional on the decision made, not only (as here) on the realized return. Szalay (2005) analyses that case, albeit for restrictive assumptions about payoff functions and probability distributions. But perhaps not too much should be made of the potential verifiability of decisions. In the present environment, a "decision" is effectively a choice of a probability distribution and it may well not be apparent to the principal what probability distribution is actually implied by what can be observed about the agent's choices. A characteristic of the recent financial crisis is that some senior bank executives had no idea what distribution of returns their subordinates were choosing when, for example, buying such financial instruments as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Many such instruments are highly complex, so the correspondence between observable choices and probability distributions may not be at all apparent.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. As explained in the text, with any contract of the form P(:;u;k) in (11), b (s;a) satisfies (10) for all (s;a). With such a contract, from (3) and (4) For that k, a does not therefore satisfy (9), so some a > a must. Thus, for that a and k, constraints (8)- (10) are satisfied for b (s;a), so it is feasible to implement a and b (:; a). Moreover, from (5) and (6), the principal's expected payoff in (7) is The expression in (17) whose sign is sought corresponds to the left-hand side of (A.5) when ξ (y) = P(y), so ξ 0 (y) = P 0 (y) and ξ 00 (y) = P 00 (y), evaluated at b = b (s;a). In view of (A.7), the first integral on the right-hand side of (A.5) vanishes when evaluated at b = b (s;a) so ∂ ∂b Now let z(y) = u(P(y(a))) u(P(y)). Then these two conditions imply for some constant of integration k. Again, this implies that the contract has the form P(:;u;k) in (11) for all y 2 Y (a;b (:; a)).
Proof of Proposition 5. For y = 2 Y (a;b(:)), the principal cannot do better than set P(y) = P, with P sufficiently low to rule out decisions b = 2ˆB(s;a;b(:)). That leaves unrestricted the contract for y 2 Y (a;b(:)). Given those payments for y = 2 Y (a;b(:)), suppose for y 2 Y (a;b(:)) the principal were to ignore the constraints (10). Then, for A = [a; a], the principal's first-order necessary condition with respect to P(y) for an optimal contract is, for all y 2 Y (a;b(:)), Φ(y;a;b(:)) + λu 0 (P(y)) Φ(y;a;b(:)) + µu 0 (P(y)) ∂Φ(y;a;b(:)) ∂a = 0;
where λ > 0 and µ are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints (8) and (9) (y;a;b(:) ) non-decreasing in y, it follows from (A.10) that P(y) is non-decreasing for all y 2Y (a;b(:)) if µ > 0 and non-increasing for all y 2 Y (a;b(:)) if µ < 0. Thus, by an argument attributed to Lambert (see Rogerson (1985, footnote 8) ), µ > 0 since otherwise P(y) is non-increasing for all y 2 Y (a;b(:)) and the agent would have no incentive to choose a > a given decision rule b(:). Thus P(y) is non-decreasing for all y 2 Y (a;b(:)). It follows that u(P(y)) is non-decreasing as a function of y for y 2 Y (a;b(:)). Thus, by the standard result in Laffont (1989, p. 32) , an agent receiving signal s always prefers b(s;a) if it is stochastically dominant in the first-order sense to any other decision for which the return is always some y 2 Y (a;b(:)). With the payments specified for y = 2 Y (a;b(:)), decisions b 2ˆB(s;a;b(:)) for which the return is not always some y 2 Y (a;b(:)) are certainly no more attractive than if P(y) for y = 2 Y (a;b(:)) were increased to ensure P(y) non-decreasing for all y. Thus, given first-order stochastic dominance, b(s;a) is also preferable to all such decisions. This establishes that b(s;a) satisfies (10) for all s, as claimed in Part 1.
The proof of Part 2 follows that of Theorem 1 in Jewitt (1988) . Given µ > 0, it follows from (A.10) and L(y;a;b(:)) non-decreasing concave in y that 1=u 0 (P(y)) is non-decreasing concave in y for all y 2 Y (a;b(:)). The condition in (22) ensures that u(P) is a concave transformation of 1=u 0 (P) and hence u(P(y)) is nondecreasing concave in y for all y 2 Y (a;b(:)). With the payments specified for y = 2 Y (a;b(:)), decisions b 2ˆB(s;a;b(:)) for which the return is not always some y 2 Y (a;b(:)) are certainly no more attractive than if P(y) for y = 2 Y (a;b(:)) were increased to ensure P(y) non-decreasing concave for all y. It then follows from the standard result in Laffont (1989, p. 32-33) Thus, since b (s; a) 2 0; θ , (15) is satisfied for a = a. Part 1 established that the only form of contract implementing b (:; a) has the formˆP(:;u;k) in (11) for all y 2 Y (a;b (:)). Recall that, with k > 0 (as required to implement a), this form implies P 00 (y) > 0. Thus, by Proposition 3, the upper part of (17) applies for all s. Hence, by Proposition 2, the principal's payoff is increased by marginally reducing b(s; a) below b (s; a) for any s.
